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This article examines what may be taken into account, when designing a mechanism of international 
public finance to support south-north cooperation on domestic climate policies in developing 
countries. We draw lessons from existing mechanisms of conditional transfers. Experience with 
conditionality provisions that the World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors apply to development 
assistance is varied. Conditionality provisions applied during the EU enlargement process are 
generally evaluated more positively, as the shared objective is increased credibility and participation. 
Clearly defining global emissions reductions as a shared objective could offer similar opportunities 
for cooperation. We discuss lessons that might be of relevance to the design of cooperative climate 
policy. 
1. Introduction 
Developing countries are expected to contribute to 39% of global CO2 emissions by 2010 (IEA 2005). 
Thus they will need to have an important role in stabilising CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere and 
global climate. However, with limited responsibility for historic emissions, pressing short term 
development goals and limited financial capabilities to reduce emissions, climate policy in developing 
countries is likely to be contingent on support provided by industrialised countries (Müller 2008).  
Project based approaches, like the Clean Development Mechanism, have been successful in delivering 
emissions reductions on a project by project basis. It may be difficult to scale-up these approaches in 
order to achieve sufficient coverage of all sectors. Difficulties also arise in successfully extending such 
a mechanism to a sufficient number of small projects. Emissions reductions, or a move towards low-
carbon growth, are therefore likely to require domestic policy initiatives. Developing countries might 
be willing to engage in such domestic policy initiatives, if they are not accompanied by high economic 
or political costs and do not undermine the countries ability to address pressing socio-economic and 
local environmental needs.  
The Bali road map created a link between action by developing countries and technology transfer, 
financing and capacity building by industrialised countries. It requires both parties to make their 
contribution in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. This raises questions about what 
lessons we can learn from previous cooperation between countries on suitable ways to structure joint 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
As both industrialised and developing countries need to make measurable, reportable and verifiable 
contributions, all parties have the opportunity to make their cooperation conditional on the observed 
contribution of the other parties. We do not aim to discuss how such conditionality will work in the 
area of climate policy, but want to collect historic examples and to provide a structured summary of 
their evaluation in academic and policy literature. We hope this can inspire new ideas and constructive 
discussion. 
Conditionality has previously been used in various settings - among them development assistance 
from the World Bank or the IMF, bilateral development cooperation, or EU enlargement.  
1 Contact: Karsten Neuhoff, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, 
CD3 9DE, UK. Financial support from the UK research council, grant TSEC2 is gratefully acknowledged. We 
are grateful for comments by Jon Stern, Chris Beauman, Ben Jones and Axel Michaelowa on earlier versions of 
this paper, and to participants of the Climate Strategies workshop on cooperative climate policy in May 2008 in 
Cambridge for input and discussion. Any remaining error or opacity is solely our own responsibility. 
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The effectiveness and the scope of World Bank and IMF conditionality are highly controversial both 
among researchers and practitioners (i.e. Burnside and Dollar 2004b; Svensson 2003; World Bank 
2006). At the same time, conditionality in the EU enlargement process is frequently acknowledged as 
an effective policy instrument (Ederveen et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Some 
research on EU conditionality has also included reference to World Bank and IMF conditionality 
(Checkel 2000; Ederveen et al. 2006), however this is less so vice versa. 
This paper assesses the implementation and verification of conditionality based on a literature survey 
of the performance of these programs. Conditionality frequently evokes negative associations. These 
may result from an institutional setting that is perceived as inequitable, or from policy objectives that 
are subject to debate. For example, the policy measures that were requested by the World Bank and 
IMF from developing countries were frequently seen as overriding national sovereignty and thereby 
undermining ownership. In addition they were associated with negative short-term effects such as 
unemployment and reduced social benefits. However, this paper does not assess the validity of such 
policy objectives, or the extent to which the policy instruments required by conditionality can deliver 
the desired objectives, instead it focuses on the mechanisms of conditionality. 
Table 1 provides a qualitative summary of evaluations of conditionality provisions within the 
literature. The level of compliance associated with the conditionality requirement, i.e. whether the 
recipient country implemented the required policy, is higher when the response in the case of non-
compliance is more credible. For example, the IMF is somewhat more stringent than the World Bank 
in reducing loans and transfers if conditionality requirements are not met. This may explain why the 
IMF is seen to be more successful in realizing the implementation of agreed policies.  
Candidate EU Member States are likely to be more persistent in implementing conditionality 
requirements, as compliance results in the benefits of membership. Also the compliance mechanism is 
strengthened by the European Commission and existing Member States’ motivation to ensure the 
integrity of the institutional set up of the EU is not threatened by non-compliance. In contrast, bilateral 
development cooperation seems to be less successful in realizing the implementation of agreed 
policies by recipient countries. This is possibly due to the ability of recipient countries to ‘choose’ 
between several donor countries, allowing recipients to avoid unilateral conditionality requirements. In 
addition, the reluctance of donor countries to reduce transfers for health or poverty reduction programs 
limits their ability to respond in the case of non-compliance. Furthermore bilateral donors frequently 
continue programs despite non-compliance because their strategic geopolitical interest and historic 
friendship outweigh the importance of credibility in the conditionality mechanism. 
 
Table 1. Qualitative comparison of conditionality provisions in different programs. 
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The literature also suggests that details of the conditionality mechanism can have a significant impact 
on its success:  
Experiences from IMF and World Bank conditionality suggest that a lack of shared ownership of 
projects and policies reduces their effectiveness and persistence. Ownership can be achieved during 
the formulation of conditions through a dialogue between the partners. As developing countries often 
have limited experience with climate policy and may have other priorities, cooperative climate policy 
can achieve ownership more successfully by building on country-specific requirements. An emphasis 
on policies with climate co-benefits may be more appealing to developing countries due to the 
importance of other national priorities. 
Transparent monitoring of compliance enhances the credibility of conditionality mechanisms. Clearly 
defined indicators are a particularly important component of successful mechanisms, as is the 
institutional framework for the monitoring and evaluating of conditionality provisions. World Bank 
experience suggests that if staff evaluate their own programme, a lack of objectivity may cause them 
to overestimate programme achievements. This highlights the importance of an independent 
monitoring and review body. An international framework for such monitoring may be preferable as it 
reduces the risk of ‘implicit conditionality’, for example requirements for the use of specific 
technologies produced by the partner country, or the pursuit of wider geopolitical interest.  
In the programs analysed, conditionality can be formulated with ex-ante requirements that must be 
satisfied before any financial transfer is received. An alternative formulation makes continued support 
dependent on sustained compliance with conditionality requirements (ex-post). So far ex-ante 
conditionality has proved more effective. 
Cooperative climate policy could for example provide financial support for the costs associated with 
specific climate or energy policies, for policies with climate co-benefits, or for the achievement of 
more specific climate or energy indicators. Thus cooperative climate policy could create links between 
policies or indicators and financial payments, thereby encouraging policy implementation. A 
precondition for success is the ability of the recipient country to implement climate and energy 
policies. Cooperative climate policy must therefore take into account a country’s institutional capacity 
for climate policy – and in some cases provide support for capacity and institution building in the first 
instance. 
The credibility of any such conditionality depends on the stringency of the response in case of non-
compliance. This has often proved to be missing – particularly in bilateral development aid projects – 
due to the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ or the geo-strategic interests of donor countries. In the first case, 
donors struggle to respond to non-compliance because they want to continue aid and health care 
provision. Responding to non-compliance is also impeded when discontinuities threaten the success of 
a project or program. For the design of cooperative climate policy, this suggests that it would be more 
difficult to limit financial support that is dedicated to aid projects if they have strong social 
components. 
In the case of EU enlargement, enforcement was more credible because existing Member States had a 
vested interest in the compliance of new member countries due to their own involvement in the EU. 
Similarly, climate conditionality may be more successful than traditional development cooperation 
because the self-interest of industrialised countries in facilitating emissions reductions may be higher 
and therefore result in more consistent implementation of the cooperative climate policy. Also from 
the perspective of developing countries, it is possibly easier to participate in climate agreements that 
contain incentive-based provisions if they share the objectives of the programs. 
The institutional setting appears to have a strong impact on the potential success of a conditionality 
mechanism. Essentially, the institutional setting of a cooperative climate policy can either be bilateral, 
multilateral, or comprise of both bi- and multilateral elements.  
A bilateral approach creates the risk that countries abandon the cooperation prematurely and engage 
with other countries. This can result in less compliance of both parties and can reduce the effectiveness 
of the cooperation. This suggests the need for some process that results in a ‘twinning’ of countries so 
as to strengthen the links.  
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However, in this case the developing countries face a greater risk that industrialised countries tie their 
support for climate policies to additional explicit or implicit political conditionality – either by direct 
conditions included in the initial formulation of the agreement or by gradual extension of the scope of 
climate policy provisions. Such bilateral cooperation thus benefits from a multilateral framework that 
creates transparency and clear rules to define the scope of the conditionality agreement and enables 
transparent monitoring to ensure the cooperation is focused on policies with climate (co-) benefits.  
In contrast, bilateral formulations of cooperative climate policy can also offer benefits. It allows for an 
approach that is better tailored to the national circumstances of a country than a purely multilateral 
setting that has to be globally harmonised. This type of duality might also enhance the level of 
accountability on both sides, as the partners may feel more responsible for their partner country than in 
a more ‘anonymous’ multilateral setting. It is also not clear whether the detailed expertise and 
experience required for cooperation and capacity building is available at sufficient scale in 
international institutions. Bilateral cooperation could directly link institutions at the national or sub-
national level. This may lead to a wider engagement of partner countries and ensure ownership by 
local stakeholders and thus enhance policy persistency and accountability on both sides. Due to the 
substantially larger number of developing countries compared to the number of industrialised 
countries, this would result in the need for every industrialised country to enter into a bilateral deal 
with a group of developing countries.  
This paper provides an initial attempt to understand the role conditionality provisions could play 
within cooperative climate policy, and as such does not claim to offer solutions to the current 
problems of conditionality mechanisms. The paper aims to explore some of the possible characteristics 
of climate policy cooperation. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework of conditionality. 
Sections 3 to 6 review conditionality provisions applied by the IMF, the World Bank, bilateral 
development assistance, and EU enlargement. Section 7 sums up what can be learnt from this review 
and section 8 concludes with a checklist of important design aspects for cooperative climate policy. 
2. General framework 
Conditionality has been used in a growing number of programmes and plans – the most prominent 
among them being conditionality tied to loans by the IMF or the World Bank. Conditionality has also 
been applied in bilateral development aid programs, and in different processes of European integration 
– from NATO expansion to EU enlargement. 
2.1 The framework of conditionality 
In the past the concept of conditionality has been described as a ‘principal-agent framework’, which 
follows the concept of neo-realism from political science. Killick (1997) puts the underlying question 
as follows: “the essential problem is how principals (in the present case, donors) can design contracts 
which embody rewards that make it in the interests of agents (recipient governments) to further the 
principals´ objectives” (p487). In this framework conditionality can also be understood as the 
“exercise of financial leverage, requiring governments to do things they wouldn’t otherwise do or to 
do things more quickly than they would choose to do” (Killick 2005b, p1). 
This formulation faces an inherent dichotomy: country sovereignty is essential to the ownership and 
successful implementation of programs; however, in the settings analysed, conditionality requirements 
reduce the level of ownership of programs by recipient countries. 
An alternative perspective on conditionality is offered by the theory of ‘social learning’. Constructivist 
thought, also based in the political science literature, expands on the role of dialogue, persuasion and 
negotiation in the strategic behaviour exhibited by human and state action (Checkel 2001). 
Conditionality can offer the basis for such a dialogue, as is suggested by the use of a mix of soft and 
strong policy instruments. 
These perspectives may fall short of explaining cooperative climate policy, where conditionality could 
possibly be a tool to align mutual responsibilities. Cooperation can, however, be understood through 
the principal-agent framework, which suggests that the principal could at the same time be an agent – 
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and vice versa. This is also reflected in what Killick (2005b) sees as the International Financial 
Institutions own description of conditionality: “an instrument of mutual accountability” (World Bank 
2005b). 
The conditionality mechanism is also defined by its institutional setting, e.g. bilateral development 
cooperation between two countries, or multi-lateral bodies like the IMF or the World Bank acting as 
counter parties for individual countries.  
A trade-off between efficiency and inclusiveness of programmes is frequently observed. Selectivity of 
cooperation partners may lead to more efficient outcomes but may exclude many partners from 
program participation. The Millennium Challenge Account of the United States is an example of 
conditionality that strongly favours efficiency over inclusiveness and puts a high emphasis on 
institutional aspects. 
2.2 Implementation 
Conditionality can be designed in different approaches: ex-ante, ex-post, desired action conditionality, 
or a mixture of these approaches. Ex-ante conditionality provides support only after certain conditions 
have been met. Ex-post conditionality requires support to be conditional on the ongoing 
implementation and monitoring of certain criteria. There are also approaches that do not create 
immediate links between the success of the programme and future support. In this case conditions are 
listed, but not necessarily binding. In the World Bank context for example, these are referred to as 
“desired actions”. Lastly, in the programs analysed, a mixture of these forms is common: pre-
conditions must be met before financial transfers or accession negotiations start, and trigger conditions 
have to be fulfilled during the programme to enable the next tranche of financial transfers or to move 
to the next step of accession negotiations. Programmes are often accompanied by less-binding policy 
provisions. 
The differences between “negative conditionality” and “positive conditionality” are sometimes 
highlighted (Rich 2004, 326f). Negative conditionality punishes the failure to meet conditions; in the 
case of cooperative climate policy for example by industrialized countries interrupting transfers or by 
developing countries stopping emissions reduction policies. Positive conditionality creates incentives 
to meet conditions by rewarding good performance, for example by supplying additional support. 
Implicit conditionality can be observed where there is an understanding that future funding of projects 
depends on their current performance.  
Continuity of programs is frequently cited as an important requirement for their successful 
implementation. As for the conditional aid system, discontinuities create uncertainties that 
compromise successful implementation of reform (Adam et al. 2004; ChristianAid 2006; Collier et al. 
1997; Eurodad 2006,). 
2.3 Results / Success 
Conditionality has become a much debated topic. Criticism of conditionality emerged mainly in the 
IMF and World Bank context. These criticisms relate to the institutional setting, particularly the 
implicit paternalism of conditionality, as well as to the objectives of conditionality. Program 
implementation has also been criticised due to the formalism and multiplicity of conditions. It is 
argued that these problems, in combination with a lack of coordination between donors, resulted in a 
lack of ownership of reforms by recipient countries. There is a debate on whether conditional transfers 
in development aid had the desired positive impact on economic growth in recipient countries, and 
whether these effects depended on the prevalence of good governance in the recipient country 
(Burnside, Dollar 2000; Easterly et al. 2004). 
Based on literature on the use of conditionality by the IMF, the World Bank, bilateral donors, and the 
European Union, an overview of the effectiveness of conditionality in these different contexts is 
presented in the next section. The review is structured as follows: First the conditionality program is 
briefly introduced with its motivation and history. Then cases of compliance with conditionality 
formulated by the mechanism are analysed. Next the reaction in case of non-compliance is discussed 
and provides information on the 
credibility of the mechanism that 
depends on monitoring and 
measuring compliance, definition 
of success, and enforcement of 
sanctions. Each review concludes 
with a brief assessment of whether 
policy objectives were achieved.  
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3. IMF Conditionality  
In short, the structure of IMF 
conditionality is as follows: The 
IMF offers loans to countries that 
need capital, and countries accept 
the conditionality clauses that the 
IMF attaches to these loans. Most 
bilateral development aid is 
conditional on recipients accepting 
the IMF (and World Bank) 
requirements. This increases the 
influence of the IMF and World 
Bank programs.  
The IMF and the World Bank offer 
the most familiar and also the most 
debated examples of 
conditionality. When founded in 1944, the IMF focused on stabilising the post-war financial system by 
providing short-term balance of payment credits to its member countries. Such credits were 
accompanied by conditionality on monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies in order to ensure that 
the IMF would be able to recover its loans (Buira 2003). Initially, conditionality requirements 
prescribed monetary and fiscal targets, but countries were free to decide which instruments to use. 
This changed from the late 1960s onwards, when the level of detail of conditions increased, and 
conditions started to include specific measures in addition to the targets (Dreher 2002). 



































Dreher, Vaubel 2004 (*1) IMF IEO 2007 (GRAs) (*2)
IMF IEO 2007 (PRGFs) (*3) Eurodad 2006 (*4)
 
(*1) 1952-94: number of binding conditions (performance criteria) per 
program started in that year (Gould 2001, Graph 1); 1995-2002: average 
number of performance criteria per program (1995-99: Goldstein 2000, 
Table 4; 2000-02: data base ´Dreher/Vaubel 2004) 
(*2) there: MONA database and IEO staff estimates 
(*3) there: MONA database and IEO staff estimates 
(*4) PRGFs; 20 selected countries only 
The worldwide economic and debt crisis during the 1980s was particularly severe for developing 
countries. This led to the emergence of structural conditionality in the form of Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs), which were believed, by the IMF and the World Bank, to be a panacea for 
developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank intensified and harmonized their cooperation 
following the lines of the “Washington Consensus”: conditions no longer focused on macro-economic 
variables, but also on supply-side and institutional issues like government taxation, expenditure plans, 
labour markets, deregulation of the economy, and privatisation (Killick 1997, p484).2
In the 1990s the concept of ‘good governance’ as a form of political conditionality evolved. It 
emphasised the importance of sound economic policy and efficient administration. From 1999 the IMF 
promoted the establishment of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) produced by developing 
countries. The PRSPs have to be set up in a participative process, including all relevant stakeholders 
from business and civil society. They outline a country’s planned macroeconomic, structural and 
socio-political programmes. PRSPs have become a precondition for IMF, World Bank and bilateral 
lending. The 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey then formally 
established the “new” development paradigms of poverty reduction: ownership and development 
partnership. 
2 Buira (2005) attributes this change to the then emerging policies of the USA and the UK to reduce the role of 
the state. 
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Dreher (2004) gives an overview of the rising number of conditions on IMF loans over time: the 
number of binding conditions per loan climbed from an average of four (1952-1973) to seven (1974-
1982) to twelve (1983-1999). Programmes between 1999 and 2001 included a total number of twenty-
one conditions, nine of them performance conditions. 
The last year an industrialised country applied for an IMF loan was 1976, at about the same time 
private money ceased to be readily available for developing countries. Dreher (2004) argues that both 
factors contributed to the increase in conditionality. 
3.1 Compliance with conditionality 
Analysis by a range of researchers suggests that compliance with IMF conditionality has generally 
been rather weak. Dreher (2004) provides an overview of this research. He shows that compliance 
rates have been around 50% and below for credit ceilings or overall fiscal deficit for the years 1969 to 
1984. Compliance in the following years ranged between 30% and 50%; with a low of 19% in 1984. 
The IMF itself reported 61% compliance with trade conditions from 1987 to 1999. Compliance with 
“prior actions” (ex-ante conditionality) was significantly higher at 80% in the same period. (All: 
Dreher 2004). 
Killick (1997) finds that IMF loans have “decisive and sustained influence” on the exchange rate and 
reform of other price variables, such as interest rates, agricultural producer prices, and the deregulation 
of consumer prices (p486). They do, however, have less influence on institutional change, for 
example, in financial sector reforms and privatization programmes. 
3.2 Reaction in case of non-compliance 
In case of non-compliance, IMF programmes are interrupted or ended. Mussa and Savastano (1999) 
studied 615 IMF programs over the period of 1973 to 1997. They found that more than a third of IMF 
arrangements ended with disbursements of less than half of the initially agreed support, and that in 
only 43%-49% of analysed cases 75% or more of the negotiated sum was distributed (Mussa, 
Savastano 1999). 
However, new programmes are also concluded for political reasons when non-compliance with the 
conditionality of previous programmes is evident (Dreher 2002). “A process of program negotiation, 
breakdown and subsequent renegotiation seems to be accepted by the Fund as an integral part of its 
relationship with client countries“ (Bird 2002, p838). 
3.3 Achievement of policy objectives 
The question of the effectiveness of IMF aid remains an unresolved issue. Many articles analysed the 
impact of aid, with the majority focusing on the impact of aid flows on GDP growth and other 
macroeconomic variables, such as investment or public consumption. These studies implicitly refer to 
the notion that aid is meant to bridge the savings-investment gap that poor countries face. Although 
the objectives for IMF lending and other donors include poverty reduction, less research has been 
conducted on the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction (Mosley et al. 2004). 
The results of research about the impact of aid on growth are mixed. Articles that have identified 
significantly positive effects face heavy methodological criticisms. In addition, it is always difficult to 
estimate the counterfactual – what would have happened in the absence of an IMF supported 
programme (Bird 2002). Surveying existing studies, the Meltzer Commission concluded, that there is 
no “significant link between IMF involvement and increases in growth and income” (Meltzer 2000, 
p39). Table 2 shows Dreher’s (2006) findings that existing studies do not provide clear evidence on 
whether IMF loans increase growth, decrease growth or have no effect on growth. However, bilateral 
aid donors seem to believe in the effectiveness of IMF conditionality: according to Bird and Rowland 
(2007), bilateral aid flows are positively correlated with a country’s involvement in an IMF 
programme. 
 Table 2 – Impact of IMF loans: Studies researching the effect of IMF loans on growth 
Type of studies Increase growth Decrease growth No effect on growth 
Before-after-studies 3 0 6 
With-without-studies 1 1 6 
Regression-based studies 3 7 5 
Source: Dreher 2006, p773. 
 
This observed ineffectiveness has nurtured criticism about IMF conditionality and inspired a process 
of “Streamlining Conditionality” in 2000. The IMF developed new conditionality guidelines in the 
review process. While these repeated many of the existing guidelines from 1979, emphasis was shifted 
to the actual implementation of the guidelines by IMF (Buira 2003). 
4. Conditionality applied by the World Bank 
The World Bank offers loans to developing countries for infrastructure or sector projects but requires 
acceptance of the conditionality clauses that are attached to these loans. 
Founded alongside the IMF in 1944, the World Bank’s objective was to promote long-term economic 
growth in its member countries by financing infrastructure and sector projects. Prior to the 1980s the 
bank was mostly financing investment in roads and dams. Conditionality was applied to loans so as to 
ensure an economic environment that would allow repayment. World Bank conditionality provisions 
were similar to that of the IMF (Killick 1997). 
As mentioned earlier, the debt crisis in the 1980s led to structural adjustment lending by both the IMF 
and the World Bank. As a result the focus of World Bank conditionality shifted initially to 
international trade and the fiscal sector, then to the financial sector, privatisation and institutional 
reform. The conditions applied by the two Bretton Woods Institutions tended to overlap, leading to 
ambiguity in their specific roles, and increasing pressure on recipient countries. 
Responding to rising critique on structural adjustment lending, in the 1990s the conditionality 
requirements included requirements of ‘good governance’. For the World Bank, this translated into 
‘sound development management’ – i.e. effective, predictable and transparent public administration, 
efficient accounting, and a binding legal framework for private sector competition. While the statutes 
of the World Bank and the IMF prohibit tying development aid to specific political conditions, 
bilateral programmes frequently contain explicit political conditionality including aspects of human 
rights and democracy.  
Initially the World Bank used fewer conditions than the IMF. The move from structural adjustment 
lending to ‘good governance’ requirements, has led to a substantial increase in the number of 
conditions applied by the World Bank. They rose from an average of 20 in 1980, to between 50 and 60 
in the early 1990s, and have since declined to about 40 in 2003 (Koeberle, Malesa 2005). Conditions 
attached to World Bank loans are less specific than those of the IMF– and the majority of them are not 






4.1 Compliance with conditionality 
Dreher (2002) provides an overview of the compliance with individual conditionality provisions. In 
the period 1978-1988, according to the World Bank’s own evaluation, 60% of conditions have been 
implemented. Dollar and Svensson (2000) show that, for a data set of 220 World Bank adjustment 
loans between 1980 and 1995, 36% of adjustment programmes were judged by the World Bank’s own 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) to be failures. According to the OED, the compliance rate 
with World Bank conditionality climbed to 95% in 1999 and then dropped again to 75% in 2004. This 
number might be upwardly biased, as a significant share of loans were not rated for borrower 
compliance (30% of loans for 2002/2003: World Bank 2005a). 
Compliance with conditionality seems to be more frequent in cases of project lending, and has risen 
over time. While the compliance rate of project lending was 50% from 1980 to1989, it increased to 
58% from 1990 to1993, to 58-65% from 1994 to1997 and to almost 80% for 1998/1999 (World Bank 
various years: Dreher 2002). 
 






































K o e b e r le ,  M a le s a  2 0 0 5  ( * 1 )
M a le s a ,  S i la rs z k y  2 0 0 5  ( * 2 )
  
(*1) % satisfactory outcomes OED rating (exit year), in World Bank 2005;                                                                     
World Bank Operations Evaluation Department 
(*2) % Adjustment Operations, satisfactory outcomes according to OED rating (approval years) 
4.2 Reaction in case of non-compliance 
The main response of the World Bank in cases where conditionality requirements are not met appears 
to be delayed assistance. Killick (1997) finds that “on average, adjustment programmes take twice as 
long to complete as intended, largely because of non-implementation of policy conditions” (p486). 
However, even though about 50% of programmes were seriously delayed (Killick 1997), in cases of 
continued non-compliance disbursement rates are near 100%: “the funds are in the end released 
irrespective of performance” (World Bank 2005a, BP5, p9). Through the analysis of more than 200 
structural adjustment programmes, Svensson (2003) comes to similar conclusion, that there is no link 
between a country’s reform effort, fulfilment of conditionality, and the disbursement of loans. Easterly 
(2003) criticises that “the success of past aid to follow conditions and the failure of past aid to follow 
conditions are both taken as justifications for future aid” (p38). 
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It has been suggested that non-compliance may even go hand in hand with additional resource inputs 
by the World Bank: Dollar and Svensson (2000) found that “the World Bank devotes far more 
resources to the failed programmes. Once a bad loan is made, there is a tendency to put a lot of 
resources into salvaging it, and our evidence shows that this is fruitless” (p896). Furthermore, the 
World Bank has not responded consistently to large economic policy changes with increased finance 
provision (Collier, Dollar 2004). 
4.3 Achievement of policy objectives 
The initial policy objective of World Bank credits was to facilitate economic growth, which was 
complemented by poverty reduction in the 1990s. However, there is dispute about the effectiveness of 
World Bank aid on growth. Hansen and Tarp (2000) analysed 131 cross-country regressions from a 
survey that assessed the effectiveness of foreign aid, drawing the conclusion that aid has a positive 
effect on the growth rate. Prominent studies by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 1998) concluded that aid’s 
impact on growth depends on a country’s good governance policies. There are, however, many 
critiques on aid effectiveness that suggest that such clear evidence of the impact of World Bank aid on 
economic growth does not exist (Easterly 2003 and 2005; Killick 1997; Rajan, Subramanian 2007). 
Other research finds that World Bank programmes do not have any positive effect on other financial 
flows, i.e. positive signals are not provided to either bilateral donors or to private capital markets 
(Bird, Rowland 2001). 
Evaluations of program success by the World Bank are more positive. The World Banks OED reports 
an increase of “satisfactory” programs – i.e. programs that it judges to have achieved or exceeded their 
main goals. The rate of satisfactory programs has climbed from 60% in the 1980s, to 68% in the first 
part of the 1990s, to 78% in the second part of the 1990s, to 82% from 2000-2005 (World Bank 
2005a). 
World Bank conditionality, as part of structural adjustment programs, has been accompanied by 
adverse effects on poorer parts of countries’ populations. For example, social indicators suggest that 
living standards have deteriorated (Dreher 2002). This criticism led to a review process for World 
Bank conditionality in 2004 (World Bank 2005a). 
5. Conditionality applied to bilateral aid flows 
The conditionality of bilateral aid flows does not, in theory, differ much from that of the IMF or the 
World Bank. Donor countries offer loans for infrastructure or sector projects, or as budget support. 
Recipient countries accept the conditionality clauses that the donors attach to these loans.  
While many publications assess multilateral aid flows, less research assesses bilateral relationships 
(Selbervik 1999). Since the 1980s, bilateral development aid usually ties programmes to IMF and 
World Bank conditionality provisions (‘cross-conditionality’). Frequently, bilateral programs include 
additional provisions relating to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (Killick 1997). Alesina 
and Dollar (1998) argue that bilateral aid flows are related to economic and strategic interests of donor 
countries3. Conditionality for bilateral aid differs in each donor-recipient-relationship – thus 
preventing a general interpretation. Examples below illustrate the diversity of approaches. 
Official development aid from the United Kingdom, as analysed by Erswell for the period from 1974-
1990, was characterised by continuity irrespective of achievement of official aid policy goals like 
gender equality or environmental protection (Erswell 1994). While the majority of aid used to require 
recipients to spend aid money on products or services from the donor country, this changed with no 
more UK aid being tied since 2001 (OECD 2001). Changes during the late nineties, and the early part 
of this decade led to a new partnership policy for development assistance in 2005. This change 
followed a general trend to increase aid effectiveness by redesigning the aid relationship, in part due to 
the influence of long-standing criticisms about previous donor efforts that resulted in recipient 
governments adopting policies with adverse effects on the poor (Mokoro 2005). The UK’s 
3 With the exemption of few countries like Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada 
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partnerships are based on a common commitment for a) poverty reduction and the Millennium 
Development Goals, b) respecting human rights and international obligations, and c) strengthening 
financial management and accountability (DFID 2005). Conditionality incorporates these objectives 
and is complemented by macroeconomic policy assessments. Although direct conditionality in IMF 
financed programmes was used to facilitate macroeconomic stability, this intervention was formally 
ceased with the introduction of the new policy (Mokoro 2005). 
Another example of bilateral aid conditionality, and one of the few examples of ex-post conditionality, 
is the recent US aid program Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The program was announced in 
2002 and formally started in 2004. The MCA is operated by the newly created Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) and has a strong selection process for candidate countries. It is innovative in that 
it establishes quantifiable performance criteria to determine country eligibility and makes both that 
data, and the selection methodology, publicly available (Herrling 2007). The concept is based on the 
assumption that aid will be more effective when given to well-governed countries and that these 
countries will respond to such rewards by pursuing sound policies. Certain preconditions concerning 
the political, social and economic environment have to be met by a country to become eligible to 
submit a compact proposal to the MCC board. 
The MCA is influenced by the hypothesis of Burnside and Dollar (2000), who suggested that aid 
stimulates growth in countries with effective management policies. This hypothesis, however, has 
been criticised by Easterly et al. (2004), who find that there is no solid relationship between good 
policies and growth. Dalgaard et al. (2004) also oppose the Burnside-Dollar hypothesis and identify 
instead a strong relationship between aid, geographical parameters and growth. 
5.1 Compliance with Conditionality 
For UK aid, there is no transparent monitoring for compliance with conditionality currently in place. 
Mokoro (2005) argues that a set of targets has been formulated but it does not directly impact 
disbursement or conditions for disbursement because of the absence of a clear link between indicators 
and resources. Therefore DFID expand? is aiming for a better monitoring of the conditions that it is 
applying. There is a rather cautious approach to defining specific conditions, the violation of which 
would indicate a breach of the program. This is despite the fact that DFID does not impose specific 
policy choices on partner governments, but rather aims to monitor partner governments’ own 
development objectives. 
So far 25 countries are eligible for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account. By satisfying the 
performance indicators, the countries have complied with the program’s ex-ante conditionality 
requirements. 15 countries have already signed contracts and 21 countries are eligible for “Threshold 
Funding” which will help them to meet the selection criteria (MCC 2007). 
5.2 Reaction in case of non-compliance 
World Bank funding and cross country studies for bilateral aid both demonstrate that the difference 
between committed and disbursed funds is uncorrelated with reform outcome as measured by the 
World Bank’s OED (Graph 3; Svensson 2003). This is attributed to the incentive schemes of bilateral 
donors, who disburse funds and allow high volume transfers – irrespective of the quality of programs 
(Dollar, Svensson 2000; Svensson 2003). Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that there are large 
differences in the reactions to recipient countries’ policy implementation. The Nordic countries tend to 
respond more directly and Japan’s aid is “highly correlated with UN voting patterns” (p54). France 
“has given overwhelmingly to its former colonies” irrespective of conditions, whilst the United States’ 
pattern of aid is strongly influenced by its interests in the Middle East; “the U.S. has targeted about 
one-third of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel” (Alesina, Dollar 2000, p33). The authors also find 
that there is generally a reward for democratisation in a country (Alesina, Dollar 2000).  
Human rights are part of the political conditionality of most bilateral aid. There has been some cross-
country research to establish to what extent respect for human rights in recipient countries has an 
impact on the volume of aid they receive. Neumayer (2003a; 2003b) argues that respect for political 
and civil rights sometimes plays a role at the eligibility-stage, and occasionally influences the volume 
of bilateral aid flows in some countries, but does not exert a consistent influence on actual allocation 
of aid volumes by the majority of donors. Personal integrity rights do not generally play a significant 
role (Neumayer 2003a; 2003b).  
Looking at individual donors can provide additional insights. The example of Great Britain may be 
typical, with the Secretary of State for International Development saying that his department 
“endeavours not to let the poor suffer by reducing our development assistance as a consequence of 
their government’s political choices or shortcomings” (Benn 2007). The British partnership concept 
emphasizes the importance of dialogue, convinced that “conditionality which attempts to ‘buy’ reform 
from an unwilling partner has rarely worked” (DFID 2005, p6). Consequently, when non-compliance 
with conditionality becomes evident, proportionate and graduated reactions have to be taken. 
Great Britain may delay or stop budget support, or other direct support, for government authorities by 
altering the channels of aid. For example, by providing humanitarian assistance in conflict areas 
(Uganda 2005/2006); offering support for an election process (Sierra Leone 2006); provision of basic 
health care (Palestinian Territories 2006); or direct support of rural access and forestry programmes 
(Nepal 2005). Interruption of UK aid was considered for Rwanda, as a consequence of threats by its 
Government to send troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo to attack the bases of hostile 
militia. After monitoring and assessment indicated that such attacks had not occurred, the interruption 
was not executed. UK aid was effectively stopped in the case of Uzbekistan because of serious human 
rights concerns (Benn 2007; DFID 2006a). 
Graph 3 – Bilateral Aid: Share of committed aid cancelled in successful and 
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With regard to the Millennium Challenge Account, the reaction in case of non-compliance is refusal 
by the MCC board to participate in the MCA. Although the selection process is designed to be 
transparent and objective, the board may deviate from the formal decision criteria and in some cases 
has done so without explanation. To give an example, in 2004, Georgia was found eligible for MCA 
funding although it clearly failed to reach several benchmarks in the selection process. This was 
probably the result of a decision by the board to support Georgia’s political transition and then newly 
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5.3 Achievement of policy objectives 
The evidence for the effectiveness of bilateral aid on growth is mixed. Some come to the conclusion 
that bilateral aid performs worse than multilateral aid, due to donors’ geo-strategic interests taking 
precedence over other growth or poverty reduction policies in the recipient country (Alesina, Dollar 
2000). On the contrary, Ram (2003) finds an impact of bilateral aid on growth that is not present with 
multilateral aid. Rajan and Submarian (2007) suggest that neither bilateral aid nor multilateral aid have 
an impact on growth. 
Masud and Yontecheva (2005) are among the few who have examined the impact of bilateral aid on 
poverty reduction. They look at improvements of two indicators of the Millennium Development 
Goals, namely infant mortality and illiteracy. They find that bilateral aid has no effect on either 
(Masud, Yontecheva 2005). Boone (1996) also examined the effect of foreign aid on growth, finding 
that aid did increase consumption but that this did not benefit the poor. 
Research by Johnson and Zajonc (2006) on the effects of the Millennium Challenge Account 
suggested that candidate countries that had not yet met the selection criteria, but who were striving to 
do s, performed 25% better on improving policy indicators than a control group of countries. Although 
this is not the case for all indicators or all countries, and the research was limited to data from the first 
two years of MCA operation, this work provides some evidence that the programme creates an 
incentive for good governance. However, the same research also looked for links between MCA 
funding and economic growth and found no such links (Johnson, Zajonc 2006). As longer time 
horizons may be required for MCA aid to affect economic growth, these results should not be 
considered definitive evidence. 
6. Conditionality applied during EU Enlargement 
Countries that want to join the European Union (EU) have to satisfy several stages of legal and 
economic reforms as pre-conditions. This process is supported with capacity building and financial 
resources. 
The EU uses conditionality in order to support reforms in its candidate countries. During previous 
enlargements to include Spain, Greece and Portugal and the Scandinavian countries, conditionality 
was limited to adoption of the acquis communautaire. In the last enlargement round, to include Central 
and Eastern European countries, conditionality was expanded to include the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ 
created in 1993. The Copenhagen Criteria was complemented in the following years by the 
requirement that a country has the “ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union” (European Council 1993). 
Examples of the last condition are a well-functioning judicial system in order to implement and 
enforce the acquis communautaire, creation of administrative units of sub-national government in 
order to administer EU regional aid, or the presence of an independent central bank in order to be able 
to join the monetary union (Grabbe 2001). There are, however, no clear benchmarks to measure 
effective implementing capacity or other conditionality issues (Nicolaides 1999; Dimitrova 2002). 
This leaves it open to existing Member States to judge whether candidate countries have met the 
conditionality requirements. According to Grabbe (2002) this is due to the fact that old Member States 
find it more important that new Member States can be brought into the Union as equal partners, than 
that they accurately meet specific conditions. 
In contrast to development aid, the EU not only offers the candidate countries financial benefits but 
more importantly EU membership, which is perceived to be accompanied by economic development, 
national recognition, freedom and political stability (Steunenberg, Dimitrova 2005).  
6.1 Compliance with conditionality 
While the implementation of the acquis communautaire has been “a consistent feature” of compliance, 
more recently rule adoption has increased towards the final stages of accession negotiations, due to the 
prospect of membership becoming increasingly realisable (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004, p679; 
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Grabbe 2001). Dimitrova (2002) finds evidence that candidate countries with few exceptions have 
introduced new laws and complied with EU criteria (Dimitrova 2002, p182).  
Democratic conditionality refers to the fundamental political principles of the European Union, human 
rights, and liberal democracy. Compliance with democratic conditionality is significantly lower than 
with acquis condionality (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). The lack of clear benchmarks 
previously described means it is more difficult to judge whether reforms actually meet the conditions. 
Countries with authoritarian governments, for example Slovakia under the Meciar government, 
Romania in the first half of the 1990s, Croatia under Tudjman, and Serbia under Milosevic, preferred 
not to meet democratic conditionality because of the high political costs of adoption and concerns 
about loss of office (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). 
According to Grabbe (2001), the link between fulfilling particular tasks and receiving particular 
benefits is uncertain. This uncertainty is more severe for democratic compliance than for other types of 
conditionality, for example, compliance under the International Financial Institutions. It has been 
found that the conditions of decentralisation and regional development have been achieved via the 
enforcement of large decentralising measures in applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
(Grabbe 2001).  
6.2 Reaction in case of non-compliance 
The most powerful conditionality tool in the EU accession process is the European Union’s gatekeeper 
role; i.e. the ability of the EU to decide which countries can proceed to the next stage towards 
accession, particularly by achieving candidate status and starting negotiations. Other mechanisms 
include aid, trade, and other benefits. The gatekeeper role is not a precise instrument that can target 
specific aspects of reform, but rather a “blunt weapon that has to be used judiciously for priority areas 
only” (Grabbe 2001, page number?). The enlargement process has thus become a multiple step process 
that is structured around milestones, at any one of which accession can be stopped (Steunenberg, 
Dimitrova 2007). 
There are a multitude of reasons why countries are not permitted to proceed onto further stages of the 
accession process: In 1997 Slovakia was not allowed to join the first round of negotiations as it was 
judged not to have met democracy criteria. Specific standards for nuclear power were imposed on 
Bulgaria and requirements for economic reform and state orphanages were set in Romania, before 
either country could join negotiations in 2000 (Grabbe 2001). Croatia’s lack of cooperation with the 
ICC in The Hague was followed by a delay of its 2003 bid for membership (Steunenberg, Dimitrova 
2005). Turkey, which received candidate status in 1999, did not start negotiations until October 2005 
due to a lack of compliance with policy reforms required under EU conditionality (Steunenberg, 
Dimitrova 2007). 
6.3 Achievement of policy objectives 
The policy objective of EU enlargement conditionality is EU rule transfer and the institutionalization 
of these reforms by future Member States. This includes “transposition of EU legislation into domestic 
law, the restructuring of domestic institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic 
political practices according to EU standards” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004, p670). 
The most tangible effect of democratic conditionality has been the introduction of minority rights and 
protection in accession countries (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). However, in general, 
compliance with democratic conditionality has been reported to be poor due to the authoritarian nature 
of some governments. Still, EU conditionality may have contributed to electoral change in these 
countries, and so can claim to have brought in to power the reform-orientated governments that finally 
implemented democratic reforms (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). Considering specific 
Maastricht fiscal policy criteria and acquis rules concerning competition policy and industrial policy, 
which restrict the payment of subsidies to loss-making enterprises (i.e. policies to harden soft budget 
constraints), Brücker et al (2005) find that EU enlargement conditionality did help accession countries 
to resolve soft budget constraint problems. 
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Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) find that EU conditionality is not equally effective throughout the 
period of preparation for accession. Conditionality decreases sharply as soon as the accession date is 
set; a sharp decline in the number of conditions set by the EU suggests that the Union is aware of this 
trend (Steunenberg, Dimitrova 2007). 
Questions have been raised about whether EU conditionality actually contradicts its own policy 
objectives. Applicant countries know that implementation of the acquis communautaire is non-
negotiable. Since joining the European Union is their primary foreign policy goal, they usually fast 
track implementation of the acquis. This leads to a lack of debate and very limited involvement of the 
parliament (Dimitrova 2002). This may result in a democratic deficit, which is contrary to the EU’s 
conditionality policy objective of ‘stable democratic institutions’. With regards to decentralisation, 
certain EU requirements produce incentives and constraints that exclude sub-national actors from the 
accession process (Grabbe 2001). Thus, as Schimmelfenning and Sedelmaier (2004) discuss, short-
term effectiveness may be partnered with long-term inefficiency, since rule adoption generally means 
formal transposition into national laws, but implementation and enforcement in everyday policy 
making is not enforced. 
There is some research that analyses the theoretical model that best explains conditionality in the EU 
enlargement process. Checkel has found that in the case of minority rights, as promoted by the Council 
of Europe, the rationalist model of cost/benefit calculations better explains compliance for unified 
Germany, while the constructivist ‘social learning model’ fares better in explaining compliance by the 
Ukraine. The author suggests that the structure of domestic institutions explains this variance in 
compliance mechanisms: pluralistic institutions and extensive historical legacies in Germany, 
compared to a transition state with more centralized structures and many “novice” political agents in 
the Ukraine (Checkel 2001). More generally, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) have shown the 
‘social-learning model’, as well as the ‘lesson-drawing model’ to be less important for the 
effectiveness of EU rule transfer (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). 
7. Lessons learnt 
In this section we draw some lessons from the above review of various conditionality mechanisms. We 
try to highlight crucial points that might be taken into consideration when orchestrating south-north 
cooperation on climate policy. 
7.1 Formulation of conditions and evaluation 
The formulation and definition of conditions, alongside devices for monitoring compliance within 
these conditions, are key characteristics of a conditionality mechanism. From our analysis, the 
following aspects seem to have a major influence on the success of a mechanism: 
Table 3 – Defining conditions, monitoring and evaluating performance  
(Measure of relevance: ++ = most relevant, O = neutral, - - = irrelevant) 
Aspect / Factors for success Relevance Experience from Source 
Define the “right” conditions4 ++ IMF, World Bank 
Dreher 2002, p40f.; Buira 2003, 
p10; Allegret, Dulbecco 2004, 
p4; Killick 1997, p488, 492f. 
Combine conditions with recipient 
country priorities (to create local 
ownership) 
++ IMF, World Bank 
Bird, Willett 2004, p438; 
Checkel 2000, p3; IMF 2001; 
Khan, Sharma 2003, p227; 
Killick 1997, p492f.; Leandro et 
al. 1999. p294 
                                                     
4 Avoid uniformity, take domestic political factors into account, bring conditions into harmony with recipient 
country priorities, avoid having a difference in policy objectives between donor and recipient 
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Clarity and limited number of conditions - to + 
IMF, World Bank, 
bilateral aid, EU 
Enlargement 
Buira 2003, p10; Dollar, 
Svensson 2000; Grabbe 2001, 
p1013; IMF 2001, p18;  Mokoro 
2005, p11; Schimmelfennig, 
Sedelmaier 2004, p672 
Clear indicators for success O to ++ IMF, World Bank, bilateral aid 
Adam, Gunning 2002; Johnson, 
Zajonc 2006; Mokoro 2005,. p11 
Independent monitoring and evaluation 
of performance5 + 
IMF and World 
Bank, bilateral aid 
(negative example) 
Allegret, Dulbecco 2004, p7; 
Dreher 2002, p19 – there:  
Vaubel 1991, p211; Killick 
1997, p488; Marchesi, Sabani 
2007, p663; Selbervik 1999, 
p53; Svensson 2003,. p383 
Complexity and specificity 
Several authors argue that a lack of clarity in formulating conditions, in addition to a wide range and 
scope of provisions, has had a negative effect on compliance with the conditionality programs of the 
IMF, the World Bank and the EU Enlargement processes (Buira 2003; Grabbe 2001; IMF 2001b). In 
contrast, other authors argue that complexity per se does not negatively affect the success of World 
Bank and EU conditionality (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier 2004). 
While there is some argument for a reduction of complexity and harmonization of conditions in order 
to enhance transparency and predictability, research on World Bank and IMF conditionality warns that 
oversimplifying conditions may have negative effects. Uniformity of conditions and a failure to take 
domestic political factors into account may have negative effects on compliance (Dreher 2002.; Buira 
2003; Allegret, Dulbecco 2004; Killick 1997). 
Ownership 
Experiences with IMF and World Bank conditionality suggest that a lack of shared ownership of 
projects and policies is believed to reduce effectiveness and persistence (Bird, Willett 2004; Checkel 
2000; IMF 2001b; Khan, Sharma 2003; Leandro et al. 1999). Ownership can be achieved when 
conditions are formulated through dialogue, while a lack of ownership can result from a lack of equity 
in the institutional setting, leading to perceived donor country dominance, amongst other factors. 
Indicators 
In order to transparently monitor compliance with conditionality, indicators are required. They can 
measure a whole range of micro and macro outcomes. Outcomes can include the allocation of targets 
for a specific policy sector, or the act of designating responsibility for the development and 
implementation of policies and measures. This was the case with IMF conditionality until the 1960s, 
when it followed macroeconomic policies and used macroeconomic indicators (IMF 2001a). In the 
1960s, the IMF started to define conditionality in more detail and added specific measures to the 
overall targets.  
Associated with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, a new layer of conditionality emerged at both 
IMF and World Bank that introduced so-called ‘process conditionality’. This involves creating 
stipulations that the government will do things in certain ways, for example, adopting participatory 
approaches. This is seen as a way of embedding conditionality more deeply into institutional and 
political structures (Koeberle, Malesa 2005). 
EU conditionality is mostly aimed at a country’s implementation of certain jurisdiction. The indicator 
for compliance is passing certain laws. This approach is criticized as it does not track the actual 
implementation and enforcement of such laws (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004).  
                                                     
5 In order to overcome pro-transfer biases of donor staff and to avoid the incentive to defend past transfers, or to 
delude past monitoring-failures 
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Evaluation 
The process of monitoring conditionality is not only dependent on the parameters used to indicate 
compliance, but also on the monitoring process and the institution conducting the monitoring. For 
example, World Bank experience suggests that if staff evaluate their own program success, a lack of 
objectivity may cause them to overestimate program achievements. It has been suggested that this is 
because they might not want their lenders to think they have been unable to judge programs in the first 
place (Dreher 2004). Both the difficulty of monitoring, and concern about monitoring failures, reduced 
the response of the IMF and the World Bank to failed programs (Killick 1997; Marchesi, Sabani 
2007). Independent evaluations of conditionality programs may deliver better results. 
7.2 Reaction in case of non-compliance 
The reaction in case of non-compliance does not always follow the theoretical principles of 
conditionality, for example due to the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ or geo-strategic interests. Reactions in 
cases of non-compliance have to take into account both the need for credibility of the conditionality 
mechanism, and the need for continuity of programs that are pursued.  
 
Table 4 – Credibility and continuity 
Aspect / Factors for success Relevance Experience from Source 
Credibility derived from stringency in 
reaction to non-compliance ++ 
IMF, World Bank, 
bilateral aid, EU 
Enlargement 
Collier 1997; Bird 2002; Killick 
1997; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 
2004; Selbervik 1999; Svensson 
2000; Ramis 1996; Mosley et al. 
1991.  
Overcome (geo-) political donor interests ++ 
IMF, World Bank,  
bilateral aid 
(negative example) 
Alesina, Dollar 2000; Allegret, 
Dulbecco 2004; Bird, Willett 2004;  
Burnside, Dollar 2000; Headey 2005; 
Killick 1997; Spiro Clark, Elizabeth 
2005; Steve Radelete 2007. 
Avoid ‘Samaritan dilemma’ + Bilateral aid (negative example) Selbervik 1999; Svensson 2000. 
Continuity of programmes 6 + World Bank, EU enlargement 
Leandro et al. 1999; Steunenberg, 
Dimitrova 2005.  
Samaritan dilemma 
The ‘Samaritan dilemma’ describes a donor’s difficulties in imposing threatening sanctions, because 
donors want, and are expected, to help (poverty alleviation). Svensson (2002) finds the ‘Samaritan 
dilemma’ to be prominent in bilateral aid relationships. The dilemma is associated with the failure of 
conditionality, as it prevents donor credibility. 
Strategic interests 
Donors have at times put their strategic interests before the negotiated conditions. This is frequently 
the case when suspension would not advance the donor country’s geopolitical interests, i.e. when the 
financial transfers actually promote objectives other than the conditional policy reforms. Such 
behaviour is widespread with bilateral aid, but also with IMF and World Bank programs (Alesina, 
Dollar 2000; Allegret, Dulbecco 2004; Bird, Willett 2004; Burnside, Dollar 2000; Headey 2005; 
Killick 1997; Lucas, Radelet 2004). Pro-lending biases in donor staff have been observed in both the 
IMF and the World Bank. There is an incentive to always disburse money as the income, prestige and 
power of donor staff depends on the amount of money transferred (Dreher 2002; Killick 1997). 
                                                     
6 E.g. patience of both partners, long-term perspective. 
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Credibility versus continuity 
Credibility and continuity are two requirements for a conditionality mechanism which are partly 
contradicting. Credibility results from the enforcement of conditionality i.e. contingent action in case 
of non-compliance. 
It is suggested by the conditionality mechanisms reviewed, that when a failure to meet conditions does 
not have an impact on future programs, a lack of credibility arises. In all cases reviewed, this is 
associated with overall failure of the conditionality mechanism (Collier 1997; Bird 2002; Killick 1997; 
Mosley et al. 1991; Ramis 1996; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004; Selbervik 1999; Svensson 2000). 
There seems to be some argument for the use of ex-ante conditionality as it has been more 
successfully applied both in the contexts of IMF conditionality (Dreher 2004), and EU Enlargement 
(Steunenberg, Dimitrova 2007). 
In the case of EU enlargement, enforcement is more credible because existing Member States have a 
vested interest in the compliance of new member countries with the accession criteria because of their 
own involvement in the EU. In contrast, in bilateral aid programs, conditionality criteria are often 
deliberately weakly formulated and as a result are frequently not enforced. 
On the one hand credibility plays a key role for the success of a conditionality mechanism, on the 
other hand it is common sense that continuity and predictability of programs and policies is an 
important factor determining the success of cooperation. 
7.3 Country specifics and institutional setting 
The public perception of a mechanism in a country can influence its success. For example, if there is 
strong opposition against a conditionality mechanism in the donor country, this negatively effects the 
success of such a mechanism in the case of the IMF and EU enlargement conditionality (Dreher 2005; 
IMF 2001b; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmaier 2004). The same may be true in cases of strong opposition 
in the recipient countries. 
Capacity-building and long-term relationships 
Research on the World Bank and EU enlargement conditionality suggests that success is associated 
with patience from both partners and viable long-term perspectives (Leandro et al. 1999; Steunenberg, 
Dimitrova 2005).  
Furthermore, from the international institutional level there is often a lack of capacity to design and 
implement programs suitable for the regional and local level. Bilateral settings may be better suited to 
implement the subsidiary principle, by linking institutions with similar capabilities at the national and 
sub-national level, rather than linking international bodies and individual countries.. This may result in 
a wider engagement in both countries, which could help to ensure ownership by local stakeholders and 
supports policy consistency. 
Institutional setting 
The institutional setting has a strong impact on the potential success of a conditionality mechanism. 
Essentially, the institutional setting of a cooperative climate policy can either be bilateral, multilateral 
or comprise of both bi- and multilateral elements. When setting up a conditionality mechanism under 
cooperative climate policy, the following aspects may be considered: 
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Table 5 – Donor and recipient country characteristics 
Aspect / Factors for success Relevance Experience from Source 
Lack of recipient´s capacity to 
implement conditions + IMF IMF 2001 
Political and social opposition in donor 
countries (veto players) O 
IMF, EU 
Enlargement 
Dreher 2005; IMF 2001; Schimmelfennig, Sedel
2004. 
Strong special interests, lack of political 
stability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack 
of political cohesion 
O IMF Ivanova et al. 2003.  
Sound institutions and policies in 
recipient country 7 -- to ++ 
IMF, World Bank, 
Bilateral Aid, EU 
structural funds 
Allegret, Dulbecco 2004; Beugelsdijk, Eijffinger
(corruption only); Boone 1996; Burnside, Dollar
Burnside, Dollar 2004b; Burnside, Dollar 199
Ederveen et al. 2006; Hansen, Tarp 2000; Ivano
al. 2003; Johnson, Zajonc 2006; Mosley et al. 2
(vice-versa); PSRA 2003, (corruption); Svensson
(democracies). 
Implicit political conditionality 
As has been shown, there is a risk of implicit political conditionality in bilateral settings. Firstly, 
bilateral conditionality tends to include ‘unofficial conditionality’. Donor countries may tie aid flows 
to strategic interests not explicitly formulated in the conditionality. The financial flow thus creates a 
dependency that is used to exert political pressure. Secondly, conditionality in bilateral settings is 
likely to gradually extend to include additional policy aspects that may not directly be linked to the 
initial policy objectives. 
Coordination versus competition 
 
Table 6 – Institutional setting 
Aspect / Factors for success Relevance Experience from Source 
Donor Coordination / Harmonization 
++ 
World Bank and 
other conditionality 
mechanisms 
Killick 1997, p488; Leandro et 
al. 1999, p294 
Recipient Competition + EU Enlargement and bilateral aid (MCA) 
Grabbe 2001, p1015; Johnson, 
Zajonc 2006, p22 
 
Bilateral agreements create a risk that partner countries might swap between partners, which would 
lead to individual countries feeling less responsibility to comply with conditions. However, the 
bilateral setting may also enhance accountability on both sides, as both countries may feel more 
responsibility for their partner country than in a more ‘anonymous’ multilateral setting. 
Competition can also arise between candidate countries in their attempt to comply with conditionality. 
Such competition has been associated with the success of the conditionality mechanism in the cases of 
EU enlargement and bilateral aid of the Millennium Challenge Account (Grabbe 2001; Johnson, 
Zajonc 2006). 
                                                     
7 For example, reform oriented environment, low inflation, protection of property rights, efficient administration, 
corruption, openness 
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8. Conclusions for south-north cooperation on climate policy 
 
The parties involved in cooperation define the conditionality requirements. Each party hopes to 
achieve something it wants or needs. The question therefore is who needs what in the case of global 
climate policy and what arrangement could help achieve these goals?  
Industrialized countries fear the consequences of climate change. For them success of climate policy 
also requires developing countries’ contributions to mitigation. Developing countries face more 
pressing short-term social and economic needs and devote more resources to addressing these 
immediate needs than to preventing long-term risks and a decrease of living standards caused by 
climate change. Thus international support is required for the implementation of domestic policies 
with climate (co-) benefits. 
Neither party is willing to engage in one-sided activities. However, as the Bali roadmap outlines, 
parties are willing to engage on the condition of engagement of all other parties. Thus linking 
international support to domestic policies may be the tool for mutual and measurable commitment in 
south-north cooperation for climate policy. 
This may create a strong sense of ownership by all partners. Firstly, south-north cooperation on 
climate policy will require equitable participation of all parties involved and therefore will have to 
respect each country’s domestic policy sovereignty – a key precondition for ownership. Secondly, the 
own interest of industrialised countries in emissions reductions may be higher than their interest in 
poverty reduction in developing countries with traditional development aid. This can increase the 
commitment of both industrialised and developing countries and thus improve the consistency and 
persistency of the cooperation. 
Regarding the institutional set up, there are benefits of both multilateral and bilateral elements in 
south-north cooperation on domestic climate policy. Bilateral relationships include country to country 
cooperation as well as interaction at the sub-national level. The bilateral setting creates the potential to 
enable capacity-building, long-term dialogue and development of real partnerships. This could ensure 
responsibility and shared ownership and thereby increase effectiveness, stability, and predictability. 
However, bilateral settings in general face a bigger risk of falling subject to strategic interests and 
implicit political conditionality.  
In contrast, a multilateral setting offers less flexibility to respond to the specific national circumstances 
and requires a large centralised capacity to manage the set of policies required. A suitable combination 
would be globally agreed, multilateral frameworks within which bilateral relationships could function. 
Political conditionality in such a framework could be limited by clearly defining both the objectives of 
the interaction and the scope of conditionality, in order to avoid exploitation of the bilateral 
relationship. The provision of an independent body for transparent evaluation and review of 
performance may also be of use. Independent evaluation could protect less powerful parties from 
political conditionality, as it would allow the enforcement of clearly specified conditionality criteria 
and evaluation results. 
The design of south-north cooperation on domestic climate policy needs to balance a reduction in 
complexity of conditions and the need for country specificity. Coordination by a multilateral body 
would also include coordination of the conditions applied, in order to harmonize conditions across 
countries. 
The UNFCCC framework requires actions to be measured, reported and verified, and therefore raises 
the question of which metrics and indicators can be used in the formulation of cooperation agreements. 
Robust and transparent evidence of policy effects may well increase support for domestic 
contributions both in the south and in the north. Furthermore, clear metrics create ‘objective’ evidence 
on policy performance and prevent governments from the north from claiming failure of programs in 
order to reduce funding as a means to exert internal and external political pressure. Finally, clear 
metrics also allow for evaluation of the performance of south-north cooperation on climate policy 
itself and may offer impetus for further improvements. Closely linked to the issue of metrics is the 
issue of ‘additionality’. As we know from discussion on the Clean Development Mechanism, 
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additionality of emissions reductions and policies will be crucial. Therefore effective cooperative 
climate policy might focus on implementation of more ambitious policies, at larger scale, scope or 
speed than would be possible without international cooperation.  
As ex-ante conditionality has proved most effective, cooperative climate policy may tie part of 
developing countries’ domestic policy implementation to the initial disbursement of funds by 
industrialized countries – and part of its disbursement to the prior implementation of climate or energy 
policies or even the achievement of more specific climate or energy indicators. However, this 
instrument has to be balanced with policy persistence and country ownership. Furthermore, the ability 
of the developing country to implement climate and energy policies is a precondition for successful 
implementation of negotiated policies. Cooperative climate policy must therefore take into account a 
country’s institutional capacity for climate policy – and in some cases initially support such institution 
building. 
Persistence of good policy, i.e. to achieve policy objectives as long as the conditionality mechanism is 
in place, and beyond, must be a central goal of cooperative climate policy. Policy success is related to 
country ownership. Towards this end, mutual social learning, with its softer forms of normal diffusion 
like dialogue, internal analysis, and negotiation, could be considered as a complement to a purely 
quantitative conditionality setting. 
The trade-off between continuity of cooperation and stringency of conditionality enforcement requires 
careful consideration. The two cases need to be considered dependent on the objective of the 
international support. If the international support is aimed directly at the implementation of the policy, 
then it is clear that it is only required with the successful implementation of the policy and linking is 
relatively simple. However, one objective of climate policy has to be a move towards less carbon 
intensive products and services. Thus it might be preferable to devote international resources to 
stimulating economic activities in new sectors, while domestic policies provide the push away from 
the carbon intensive sectors. Such domestic policies do not create direct costs for the government, but 
require support to overcome costs for consumers. The financial support will therefore have to be 
devoted to different policy areas. In this case the resources should not be directed to essential 
humanitarian activities so as to avoid the ‘Samaritan dilemma’.  
We have seen that stringent reactions in cases of non-compliance are essential for the success of a 
conditionality mechanism. South-north cooperation on domestic climate policy will be most credible 
where it is on the agenda of national and international decision makers. In this case a stringent 
response to failures of either party to deliver its part of the deal is more likely to occur and therefore 
the conditionality provisions will be more credible. There is always the risk with conditionality that 
cooperation results in an intrusion on domestic issues. It is therefore important to make the mechanism 
transparent and to base it on a culture of equity, trust and openness. In this process it will be 
particularly important to look more carefully at the institutional settings of climate cooperation from 
the perspective of industrialised countries. Effective cooperation requires two partners – as illustrated 
by the difficulties and discussions about the governance structure of the Global Environment Facility. 
This discussion focused on aspects of mitigation policy. While some of the insights also apply to 
adaptation, this does require a separate discussion to reflect the specificities. For example both parties 
have an interest in delivering the emissions reductions and might pursue efforts towards ensuring 
targets are met. In contrast, international cooperation for the support of adaptation measures is mainly 
in the interest of the developing countries that receive support for these measures. Also, the ‘Samaritan 
dilemma’ implies that it is more difficult to abandon cooperation programs on adaptation measures to 
protect the population of a country than to abandon cooperation on a specific mitigation program. 
After all, abandoning the cooperation on one mitigation policy increases the credibility of the 
compliance mechanism for all parties involved and can thus contribute to overall emission reductions 
and policy success. 
The conclusions above provide a suggestion of which aspects may be taken into consideration for the 
design of a conditionality mechanism in climate policy. This topic has not been discussed extensively 
here, as this article aims be a starting point for further research, practical work and political dialogue. 
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